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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Name: Syed Naeem Firdous 
Title: Anomaly Detection Technique for Honeynet Data Analysis 
Major Field: Computer Networks 
Date of Degree: Jan-2011 
A Honeynet is a network designed by the Honeynet Project organization to gather information on 
security threats. Honeynet is a controlled network of vulnerable computers (honeypots) and is being 
used by organizations to proactively improve their network security as it is designed to identify 
malicious traffic and unauthorized activities on the network. Honeynet captures a substantial amount 
of data and logs for analysis in order to identify malicious activities. The analysis of this large amount 
of data is a challenging task. The main aim of this work is to use an anomaly detection technique to 
detect new and unknown attacks using data collected by Honeynets. In this work we propose an 
anomaly detection technique that will efficiently analyze the Honeynet data and will help in learning 
the behavior and techniques used by the hackers. In this work, we have used feature-based and 
volume-based schemes to identify anomalies in Honeynet traffic. A detailed analysis of various traffic 
features were carried out and the most appropriate features for Honeynet traffic were selected. The 
anomaly detection was done by using threshold values of entropy distributions for feature-based 
parameters and volume changes for volume-based parameters. The behavior of various anomalies was 
defined using the selected features and their respective threshold values. In this work, we show that 
our proposed technique which utilizes both feature-based and volume-based parameters is effective in 
detecting most types of anomalies seen in Honeynets. 
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كًٍت كبٍشة يٍ انبٍبَبث وانسجلاث نخحهٍههب  شبكبث انؼسم هخمظح. انًشوس انضبسة والأَشطت غٍش انًصشح به ػهى انشبكت
وانهذف انشئٍسً يٍ هزا انؼًم هى  .انكبٍش يٍ انبٍبَبث يهًت صؼبتححهٍم هزا انكى ٌؼخبش  .يٍ أجم ححذٌذ الأَشطت انخبٍثت
حى نكشف ػٍ ولىع هجًبث جذٌذة وغٍش يؼشوفت ببسخخذاو انبٍبَبث انخً بهذف ا ذاشالسلوك ال عن الكشفاسخخذاو حمٍُت 
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Chapter 1 
1 
Introduction 
Computer network security is a major area of concern for different people from normal 
home users to businesses trying to protect their resources from unauthorized access. The 
moment a computer is connected to the Internet, the computer is physically connected to 
millions of computers in the network. There is constant threat from malicious users who 
are trying to disrupt normal operations or trying to steal sensitive or proprietary 
information. Network security is a prominent feature of the network ensuring 
accountability, confidentiality, integrity, and above all protection against many external 
and internal threats such as hacking, denial of service attacks, worms, Trojans, etc. 
Computer network security is generally taken as providing protection at the boundaries of 
an organization, keeping the bad guys (e.g. black hat hackers, script kiddies, etc.) out.  
1.1 Honeynet 
The Honeynet is a network designed to gather information on security threats which can 
be used by the organizations to proactively improve their network security. A Honeynet 
can be used to assist system administrators in identifying malicious traffic in the 
 
 
2 
enterprise network. By its very nature, a Honeynet has no production value and should 
not be generating or receiving any traffic. Any traffic to or from the Honeynet is 
suspicious in nature. The key requirements to successfully implement a Honeynet, is data 
control, data capture, and data analysis[1].  
The Honeynet Project is an international volunteer organization dedicated to computer 
security research. It was founded in 1999 and holds non-profit status to provide a global 
research perspective, and the organization is strongly committed to the ideals of the Open 
Source movement. The goal of the Honeynet Project is to learn about the tools, tactics, 
and motives involved in computer network attacks, which is primarily carried out through 
the use of honeypots and honeynets. A series of honeypots and Honeynet related 
technologies have been developed to help support the Honeynet Project's research goals, 
all of which are freely available for download from the Honeynet website[2]. The 
members of the Honeynet project regularly generate research publications on new threats 
and technology improvements and are released in the form of Know Your Enemy (KYE) 
white papers, which are available from the Honeynet website[2]. 
A honeypot has been defined as a security resource whose value lies in being probed, 
attacked, or compromised[2]. There are two types of honeypots[3]: High Interaction and 
Low Interaction. High-interaction honeypots provide real systems, applications, and 
services for attackers to interact with. The advantages of high-interaction honeypots are 
that we can capture extensive amounts of information by giving attackers real systems to 
interact with. It enables us to learn the full extent of their behavior, everything from new 
root-kits to international IRC sessions. Honeynet, Sebek, and CaptureHPC are some of 
the examples of high-interaction honeypots[2]. Low-interaction honeypots provide 
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emulated services and they are easy to install and deploy. These types of honeypots 
capture limited information about the hackers and they are generally useful to understand 
a specific activity of the hacker. Honeyd, Nepenthes, and Google Hack are some of the 
examples of low-interaction honeypot. 
Figure 1-1 shows a GenII Honeynet architecture, which is a highly controlled network 
used to contain and analyze attacks.  
 
Figure 1-1 : Honeynet Architecture 
Gen II and Gen III honeynets have 3 layers of data capture. These 3 layers are: 
 Firewall: Honeywall has built in firewall which is used for data control and it also 
creates logs that are useful for analyzing various activities on the honeypot. 
 IDS:  Honeywall uses Snort IDS system for alert generation and to identify 
attacks.  Snort creates its log files and also captures the packets passing through 
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the honeywall. Honeywall also uses Hflow daemon which coalesces data from 
snort and other tools into a database. 
 Honeypot Data Capture: The third of data capture is at the honeypot itself which 
runs tools like Sebek (kernel module) which collects keystroke information at the 
honeypot. 
The honeywall collects data such as Iptable logs, keystoke logs, file and I/O data, passive 
OS fingerprints, snort alerts, netflow data, and full binary packet dumps[4]. In the 
Honeynet, data coalescing is done by using a backend daemon called Hflow2.  It  
coalesces data from snort, p0f, and sebek into a relational database (i.e., MySql). Hflow2 
is placed below the helper tools Snort and POf as shown in Hflow2 architecture (refer to 
Figure 1-2). The main responsibilities of Hflow2 are to[5]: 
 Synchronizes the helper tools 
 Generates and store a composite view in the database and in a PCAP file 
Hflow2
Snort POf
Libpcap or Iptables
PCAP RDBMS
Helper Processes
 
Figure 1-2 : Honeynet Hflow2 Architecture[5] 
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Currently, a Honeynet gathers a lot of network data and this sometimes makes it difficult 
to analyze this huge data set. However, a honeynet’s real potential will not be realized 
until organizations can effectively deploy multiple honeynets and correlate the 
information they collect. The main objective of this thesis is to propose a data analysis 
technique of honeynet data to identify anomalies. This would help the administrators to 
better use the Honeynet data to understand the vulnerabilities in the system and take 
necessary actions to protect their systems from malicious activities. 
1.2 Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly Detection refers to a technique of detecting patterns that are different from the 
normal behavior. Anomaly detection helps to identify new or unknown patterns in any 
data set. The abnormal patterns with in any data set are referred to as anomalies, outliers, 
exceptions, peculiarities, etc.[6]. Figure 1-3 shows the regions which are labeled as 
normal or outliers. 
 
Figure 1-3 Anomalies or Outliers[6] 
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Anomaly detection is a very useful concept due to its wide application in various fields. 
An anomalous behavior in the network could indicate a compromised machine or a 
machine transmitting sensitive data out of the network. There are various challenges in an 
anomaly detection approach such as defining the normal behavior and abnormal behavior, 
capturing most of the normal behavior, etc. Due to this reason, most of the existing 
anomaly detection schemes tackle only a specific problem.[6]. 
In information theory, Entropy is defined as a measure of uncertainty or randomness 
associated with a random variable [7] or in this case data coming to a honeynet network. 
Entropy provides the measure of deviation in data items. Entropy can be used to detect 
anomalies in a given data set by finding out the variations in the entropy value. The 
entropy values of a sample of size   lies in the range        ]. The entropy takes a 
minimum value of 0 when there is no variation in the data items (e.g., single IP address or 
port) and entropy takes the maximum value of      when all the data items are distinct or 
the variation is large. In entropy-based detection techniques, the entropy of a random 
variable X with possible values                 can be calculated as 
          
 
   
             
Suppose we randomly observe X for a fixed time window , then            , where 
   is the frequency or number of times we observe X taking the value   , i.e. 
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Where: 
      Entropy. 
   = number of packets with    as the traffic feature 
  = total number of packets 
If we want to calculate the probability of a traffic feature, 
       
                                           
                       
 
Here, the total number of packets is the number of packets seen for a time window T. 
1.3 Summary 
The concept of Honeynet and anomaly detection was introduced in this chapter. The 
different types of Honeynets were presented and the Honeynet architecture was explained 
in detail. This chapter has provided a brief introduction to anomaly detection concepts 
and the use entropy in anomaly detection has been discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
2  
Literature Survey 
This section discusses the literature survey of various papers done in order to understand 
the research work done by other researchers in similar field. The success of a Honeynet 
depends on the way the data is collected and how we can interpret the results to better 
understand the vulnerabilities in our systems. The Honeynet implementation involves the 
deployment of a honeywall gateway and honeypots. Data capture involves monitoring 
and logging all the activities and traffic that enters or leaves the Honeynet. The data 
capture in a Honeynet is done in three layers and different formats of data are captured. 
The following section presents the details of the types of data captured in the honeywall. 
2.1 Types of Data Collected in Honeynet 
The Honeynet architecture includes a gateway and honeypots. The honeypots are placed 
behind the gateway and all the traffic to the honeypot goes through the gateway. This 
results in data being captured at different points within the honeynet network. The three 
layers of data capture are [8]: 
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1. All network activity (packets and full packet payload) must be captured in PCAP 
binary format (OpenBSD libpcap standards) and rotated on a daily basis (backing 
up the captured data). 
2. Firewall logs must be converted to IPTables ASCII format. The data collected is 
stored in binary format and is used for off-line analysis of the collected traffic. 
3. System activity is recorded using the format provided by Sebek. The data captured 
could be in the form of the attackers’ keystrokes and/or operating system logs.  
The Honeynet data captured must be stored in a secure location and there should be no 
data stored locally in the honeypots. A central location must guarantee the integrity, 
authenticity, and confidentiality of information. Another aspect to make data collection 
secure is implementing encryption [9]. Some of the standards for data capture with in a 
honeynet are specified in [8]. Table 2-1 summarizes[1] the types of data collected in 
honeynet systems. 
Table 2-1: Different Types of Data that can be captured in Honeynet 
Data Types Tools Required for Analysis Size of Collected Data 
MySQL backup (Consists 
of tables of Hflow database) 
MySQL Admin tool, Walleye 
Size if dependent on the 
amount of data collected 
PCAP network traces Wireshark, Network Miner etc. Usually in MBs or larger 
System Logs Text Editor or VI 
Size is based on the 
collected data 
Logs created by other 
honeynet implementations 
(Nepenthes, Dionaea, 
HoneyD etc.) 
Manual analysis and scripts 
Size is based on the 
collected data 
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The various honeypot implementations result in the collection of large amount of data of 
different types like: packet-captures, tcpdump data, malicious binaries, keystroke logs, 
and URLs of malicious websites [8]. The raw data collected from a Honeynet can be used 
to derive additional information on a hacker’s activities. However, it becomes difficult to 
analyze the captured data without the use of automated analysis tools. The 
“needlessstack” data overload (too much data and different types of data) is one of the 
main challenges for Honeynet analysts [8]. Honeynets are now used widely by many 
researchers and network operators to analyze the network vulnerabilities. However, high-
interaction honeypots collect a large amount of data from various data sources making it 
difficult to manage honeypots and to understand the collected data[10]. 
In a Honeynet, data analysis can be performed using the standard analysis tools like 
tcpdump, ethereal, and Walleye. The introduction of hflow and walleye web interface 
greatly improved the Honeynet data analysis by integrating different data sources and 
reducing the time to analyze the Honeynet data [5]. The limitations of Walleye user 
interface include the use of very constrained query language and no direct GUI access to 
process centric viewpoints ( i.e., failure to observe Sebek data when the system is 
working as designed) [5]. This implies that walleye has a limitation of not being able to 
show results specific to certain events and it sometimes fails to read data related to Sebek 
from the database. The Honeynet data analysis tools have undergone several revisions. 
The second generation data analysis tools use a relational model only for Sebek [11] data. 
The third generation tools use a relational model to store both network (flow) data and 
host (sebek) data [5]. 
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2.2 Anomaly Detection Technique 
In network security, anomaly detection plays a major role in detecting network security 
breaches or intrusions. Unlike its counterpart known as misuse-based or signature-based 
detection, the anomaly detection techniques are very useful in detecting new and 
unknown attack patterns. It is especially useful for detecting attacks such as [12]. 
 New buffer overflow attacks carrying shellcode 
 New exploits 
 Intentionally stealthy attacks (e.g., using ADMutate to transform a shellcode) 
 Variants of existing attacks in new environments (e.g., worms using different file 
names as they propagate) 
There exist in literature two main categories of detection techniques applied to network 
traffic: 
Volume-based detection techniques [13], [14], [15], [16]: A volume-based detection 
scheme is useful when identifying anomalies that cause large change of traffic volume, 
for example, in a flooding attack or certain types of DoS attacks. The anomalies that do 
not cause large traffic volume changes cannot be detected by volume-based detection. 
Feature-based detection techniques: [17], [18] The feature-based detection scheme uses 
the distributional changes of packet header details like IP addresses and port numbers to 
detect anomalies. Feature-based detection techniques require header inspection of each 
packet and this is time consuming and not applicable with real time constraints. 
Lakhina et al [17] proposed an anomaly detection method using traffic feature 
distributions in which they argue that distributions of packet features like IP addresses 
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and ports are useful in detecting a wide range of anomalies in the network traffic. The 
authors stated that by using entropy along with traffic feature distribution, they can 
sensitively detect a wide range of anomalies. It also helps in clustering the anomalies into 
different clusters. In their experiment, they used network wide traffic (whole network 
traffic) as the data source as it contains various types of normal and abnormal traffic. The 
authors noted that identifying the nature of anomalies in a huge data set is a challenging 
task as the anomalies are a moving target. An anomaly detection system that depends on a 
predefined set of anomalies is inefficient as the anomalies are varying constantly. The 
authors pointed out that most of the anomalies affect the distributional aspects of traffic 
features like IP addresses and port numbers. The main difference between the method 
used by [17] and previous work is that they used traffic feature (such as IP address and 
ports) distributions to detect anomalies compared to using traffic volume to detect 
anomalies. They note that not all anomalies cause volume changes in traffic but most of 
the anomalies can be effectively detected using traffic feature distribution. The traffic 
features used by the authors are: source and destination IP addresses, source port, and 
destination port. The authors used the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for traffic 
anomaly detection, which is used to separate the normal and anomalous behavior through 
dimensionality reduction. In our work we are using traffic coming only to Honeynet and 
we are using both traffic feature distributions and volume parameters to detect anomalies. 
Nychis G., et al [18] presented an interesting work by conducting an empirical evaluation 
of using entropy for anomaly detection. The authors mainly focused on analyzing the 
effectiveness of using different traffic features and behavioral features distributions for 
anomaly detection. The behavioral features include the degree of distribution measuring 
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the number of distinct source and destination IP addresses that each host communicates 
with. They conducted various experiments and showed that the IP address and port 
distributions are strongly correlated and provide similar detection capabilities. The 
behavioral and flow size distributions are less correlated and hence detect anomalies that 
are usually not detected by address and port distributions. The authors calculated the 
correlation between different feature pairs based on the entropy values to find the 
correlated feature pairs. The authors suggested that the selection of traffic feature 
distributions must be made carefully and it must not be restricted to port/address features.  
In our work we are using the feature pairs that have the best detection capabilities in 
Honeynet traffic. The traffic features were compared and the best features found during 
the training phase were used for anomaly detection. 
Kind A et al. [19] have proposed a new approach to the feature-based anomaly detection 
of Lakhina et al [17]. In their proposed approach the authors created histograms of the 
different traffic feature distributions and then modeled histogram patterns which are used 
to detect anomalies.  They detect anomalies in four stages: select features and construct 
histograms, map into metric space, cluster and extract models, and finally classify the 
anomalies. In their approach, the authors use various traffic features like source and 
destination addresses, port numbers, TCP flags, etc. In this approach, PCA has been used 
for dimensionality reduction instead of differentiating between normal and abnormal 
traffic as done in [17]. The main difference of this approach is in the use of histograms to 
detect anomalies instead of using entropy. In our thesis work we are using entropy values 
of different features along with clustering techniques to detect anomalies in Honeynet 
traffic. 
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Ping, D. and S. Abe [15] proposed an IP packet size entropy-based DoS detection scheme 
in which changes in the IP packet size entropy (IPSE) is used to detect possible DoS 
attacks. The authors note that various applications have different packet size profiles and 
this distribution changes in the presence of potential DoS attacks. The authors illustrated 
that the various applications have default packet sizes with respect to request/response 
data (various services have default packet sizes based on the service provided). For 
example, FTP applications have 40 byte acknowledgement and full packet data of 1500 
bytes. In the presence of attacks, the generated packets are of identical sizes irrespective 
of the response from the victim. The threshold of entropy is obtained by self-learning 
from legitimate traffic data. After setting the threshold value, the entropy that exceeds this 
value indicates the presence of attack traffic. The IPSE approach was able to detect short 
term as well as long term attacks; which is an improvement over the traditional volume-
based schemes. In our approach we utilized the detection capabilities of volume-based 
schemes along with the feature-based detection schemes. 
Thonnard, O. and M. Dacier [20] proposed a clustering-based approach to detect attack 
patterns in Honeynet data. In their approach, they specifically use time signature to 
cluster the Honeynet data. Time series is defined as a sequence of data points measured at 
successive times separated by uniform time intervals. Figure 2-1 shows how two attacks 
have temporal similarities even though they target different ports. They conducted 
experiments on large data sets collected from 44 worldwide distributed honeypots. 
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Figure 2-1 Two different attacks detected using two different sensors [20] 
The attack source is identified as an IP address that targets the honeynpot on a given day 
with certain port sequence. The network characteristics used by the authors include: (i) 
the number of virtual machines targeted on a platform, (ii) the number of packets sent to 
each virtual machine, (iii) the total number of packets sent to the platform, (iv) the 
duration of the attack session, (v) the average inter-arrival time between packets, and (vi) 
the associated port sequence. In our work we are applying an entropy based anomaly 
detection technique to detect anomalies in Honeynet data. 
Al-Haidari et al [21], proposed an entropy-based countermeasures against DoS attacks. In 
their work they used packet size entropy to and the corresponding threshold values to 
distinguish normal traffic and attack traffic. In their work they illustrated that entropy-
based scheme enhances the performance of the firewalls in terms of throughput, delay and 
availability by isolating the attack traffic from the legitimate traffic. In our work we are 
using the threshold levels used in this approach and applying it in detecting anomalies in 
honeynet traffic. 
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2.3 Summary 
This chapter presented the research done by various other researchers in the anomaly 
detection techniques. In the first part the main problems related to Honeynet data analysis 
was presented. In the later part different anomaly detection approaches proposed by 
various researchers were presented. The main difference between the existing work and in 
our proposed approach is that we are using both feature-based detection scheme and 
volume-based detection scheme to detect anomalies in the Honeynet traffic. The main 
purpose of this contribution is to aid the analysts in analyzing Honeynet data. 
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Chapter 3 
3 
Honeynet Data Analysis Problem and 
Proposed Solution 
This chapter focuses mainly on the main problems that are faced in Honeynet data 
analysis and the proposed solution. It discusses the anomaly detection approach used in 
this thesis work. The later part of the chapter provides a detailed description of the 
anomaly detection approach used in this work. The current Honeynet system does not 
include anomaly detection schemes to identify anomalies in the Honeynet traffic. 
Anomaly detection is useful for detecting zero day attacks and unknown attacks in the 
network. A Honeynet also collects a substantial amount of data and any incoming data to 
the Honeynet is considered malicious. Many Honeynet deployments currently use Snort 
(a Signature-based Intrusion Detection tool), to detect malicious activities, but it is known 
to generate high rate of false positives [22]. 
3.1 Problem Statement 
Honeynet captures information that can be used by administrators to improve their 
network security, but the size of the data collected can be overwhelming [23]. Honeynets 
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depend on a signature-based detection scheme, manual analysis and expertise to identify 
malicious activities. For example the high-interaction honeypot Honeywall CD-ROM 
uses Snort: a signature-based detection tool to detect malicious activities. The signature-
based detection schemes cannot detect new attacks [24]. Honeynet traffic is different 
from any other network wide traffic as it has little or no production traffic. Any traffic 
that enters or leaves the Honeynet is suspicious by nature. However, in order to identify 
malicious activities in this traffic requires manual analysis and expertise of identifying 
such attacks.  
There are very few anomaly detection techniques addressing the Honeynet systems and 
most of the traffic is analyzed manually which requires expertise to identify different 
types of attacks. The few existing approaches mostly focus on detecting botnets and 
worm or virus outbreaks as they analyze traffic collected from low-interaction honeypot 
sensors setup across the world. Honeynet traffic is different from other types of network 
traffic as every packet that enters or leaves the Honeynet is considered malicious. Due 
this most of other anomaly detection approaches which rely on regular network wide 
traffic are not well suited for this type of traffic [20]. As stated before Honeynet is used 
by various organizations to proactively improve their security hence the malicious 
activities must be detected quickly and with relative ease. Another more important use of 
Honeynets is to identify the tools tactics or behaviour of different attacks and share these 
findings. In order to address these issues we propose a simple and easy to use anomaly 
detection technique which can be used to identify anomalies in Honeynet traffic and also 
to identify the behaviour of various malicious activities. 
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In our proposed approach, we are using both feature-based and volume-based detection 
schemes to identify anomalies in Honeynet traffic. Most of the other research work in 
literature is focused mainly in comparing the effectiveness of these two techniques or to 
propose a technique based on either one of these. In our work the main focus is to identify 
the best features that can be used to identify anomalies in Honeynet traffic and also to 
identify the behaviour patterns of various types of attacks. 
The main aim of this work is to effectively analyze and identify attacks in the network 
traffic collected by Honeynet deployments. In this work, we propose an anomaly 
detection technique which uses both feature-based and volume-based schemes to detect 
anomalies in the Honeynet traffic. The proposed detection scheme can be used to detect 
outliers in the Honeynet traffic and help in identifying the behavior models for various 
types of attacks. The proposed approach uses a combination of packet header details and 
volume changes to identify malicious activities. This approach has not been used before 
to analyze Honeynet traffic. Apart from this, the combination of features is selected by 
extensive evaluation of various features.      
The above proposed method is composed of the following main steps: 
1. Analyzing Honeynet traffic data and identifying the candidate features suitable for 
anomaly detection. 
2. Selecting the features that provide good detection capabilities from those available 
in the literature as well as those obtained from the manual data analysis. 
3. Designing and implementing a suitable anomaly detection technique. 
4. Identifying anomalies in Honeynet data by classifying the traffic into normal or 
abnormal traffic. 
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It must be noted that since the main idea of using a Honeynet is to perform offline data 
analysis of the captured data, real time constraints in detecting anomalies do not apply. 
However, anomaly detection should be done in a reasonable amount of time to perform 
an effective and quick data analysis. 
The Honeynet project is a useful resource to learn the tools, motives and tactics of the 
blackhat community. Using an anomaly detection scheme in Honeynet will greatly 
improve the data forensics and the detection of unknown and new attacks. 
Assumptions: Data source used for anomaly detection will in the form of PCAP files 
captured from Honeynet systems 
3.2 Analyzing Honeynet Test Data Set 
In order to detect anomalies in the network traffic, we first need to analyze different 
Honeynet traffic data sets to understand the difference between the normal and abnormal 
behaviors. Honeynet traces were collected mainly from the honyenet.org site which 
mainly includes the scan of the month (SOM) challenges and Forensic Challenges 
released by the Honeynet organization [25]. The other sources of traces were from 
hack.lu 2009 Information Security Visualization Contest [26] and from the Honeynet 
deployment in KFUPM. The Honeynet traces that were used are list in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Honeynet Traffic Test Datasets used for Analysis 
Traffic Data Set Name & 
Source 
Description Traffic Details 
Pcap Attack Trace, 
Honeynet.org – Forensic 
Challenge 
The network traffic captured in 
the file attack-trace.pcap relates 
to an automated malware attack 
that exploits the Windows Local 
348 packets 
Total duration 16 sec 
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Traffic Data Set Name & 
Source 
Description Traffic Details 
Security Authority (LSA) 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) 
service. 
Scan 28 - Honeynet.org – 
Scan of the Month 
Trace collected by the Mexico 
Honeynet Team - Italian 
blackhats break into a Solaris 
server then enable IPv6 
tunneling for communications. 
Two traces: 
Day1: 18843 Packets – 24 
Hours 
Day 3: 123123  Packets – 
24 Hours 
Scan 14 - Honeynet.org – 
Scan of the Month 
This trace is about a successful 
Windows NT attack. 
6707 packets 
Total Duration 20 Hours 
Scan 19 - Honeynet.org – 
Scan of the Month 
Trace of Redhat Linux 6.2 
honeypot compromise. 
24440 packets 
Total Duration 23 Hours 
 
The traces provided by the Honeynet organization are instances of real compromises that 
were captured by different honeynet chapters. The main reasons for releasing such 
challenges are to help the network security analysts to hone their forensic and analysis 
skills to get an in-depth knowledge of real attacks. These traces proved crucial in our 
work to characterize and identify the important features in the honeynet traffic. As these 
traces are collected in a real environment and specifically in a honeynet setup, it was of 
more importance to our work. 
These traces were analyzed to identify the suitable characteristics / features that can be 
used for anomaly detection. The analysis was done using tools like Wireshark and 
NetMiner. The classification techniques that were used in this work are: 
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Feature-based classification: Uses features like Source Address, Destination Address, 
Port, protocol, etc. Various features were analyzed and a list of possible features was 
selected. 
Volume-based classification: In this scheme, the change in traffic volume was used to 
detect anomalies in the network traffic. 
The list of features that were recorded from the literature and identified during test data 
analysis is mentioned in  
Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 List of Features Selected from Test Data Analysis and Literature 
Traffic Features Description 
Source Address[17] 
Source IP address: This parameter indicates the 
entropy of the unique IP addresses of incoming 
connections to the honeypot 
Destination Address[17] 
Destination IP address: The destination IP entropy 
indicates the number of external connections initiated 
by the honeypot. 
Source Port[17] 
Port number of the source machine.  This attribute 
indicates the number of source ports that are visible 
during each interval. 
Destination Port[17] 
Destination port number.  This parameter indicates 
the number of destination ports visible during each 
interval. 
Indegree[18] 
Number of distinct Hosts that connect to the 
observed host.  This parameter indicates the number 
of incoming connections to the honeypot. 
Outdegree[18] 
Number of distinct IP address the observed host 
connects to.  This feature measures the number of 
outgoing connections from the honeypot.  
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Packet Size Distribution[15] Various packet sizes visible in the network traffic 
Application Protocol Used 
Application protocol seen during the conversation 
(eg. SSH, SMTP, FTP etc) 
Origin of IP address - Country 
The distribution of countries from which the 
observed host gets connections 
Volume Features Description 
Average number of bytes per TCP 
packet per minute [27] 
Average TCP packet  size per minute 
Average number of bytes per UDP 
packet per minute [27] 
Average UDP packet size per minute 
Average number of bytes per ICMP  
packet per minute [27] 
Average ICMP packet size per minute 
Sum of average packet size[27] Aggregate sum of  
Total Payload Bytes Total bytes seen in the five minute interval 
Volume Features Description 
Average Inter-arrival times 
Average inter-arrival time of packets in five minute 
interval 
Average Payload Size 
Average payload size seen during the five minute 
interval 
Total Packets Total packets seen during the five minute interval 
Some of the features which provided redundant information were eliminated such as 
application protocol used can be also be detected using the ports used. Similarly, instead 
of using the average packet sizes for different transport protocols we choose average 
packet size. 
Table 3-3: Traffic Features used for a Detailed Analysis 
Traffic Features Volume Features 
Source Address Average Packet Inter-arrival Time 
Destination Address Total Payload bytes received during the interval 
Source Port Average Payload size during the interval 
 
 
24 
Destination Port Total Packets received during the interval 
Packet Size Distribution  
Indegree & Outdegree  
3.3 Feature Evaluation 
The features listed in Table 3-3 were tested for their detection capabilities. For testing 
these features, we used entropy-based traffic feature distributions and volume distribution 
(for volume-based features) to determine the type of anomaly that the particular feature 
could detect. The real honeynet traces obtained from Honeynet.org were used to test the 
effectiveness of each individual feature. The entropy distributions were obtained by 
calculating the entropy values of each five minute interval using             Equation 3-1. 
              
 
                           Equation 3-1 Entropy 
The sliding window concept was used to gather entropy values in overlapping intervals 
(refer to Figure 3-1) so that any valuable information is not missed in cases where 
anomaly overlaps across multiple intervals. 
 
Figure 3-1: Sliding window used for calculating entropy 
The entropy values of each feature were recorded and further manual analysis of was 
done to identify the normal behavior and anomalous behavior. Initially, all the features 
listed in Table 3-3 were tested, and later the best features that can be used for anomaly 
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detection were selected. Different features show different variations in the entropy values 
and the features that detected the most anomalies were determined. 
3.3.1 Data Set: Scan 28. 
This dataset was published in the scan of the month challenges in the honeynet.org 
website. The trace was collected by the Mexico Honeynet Team which is about the Italian 
blackhats that broke into a Solaris server and then enabled IPv6 tunneling for 
communications. The day1 traffic set has the honeypot being compromised and the day3 
traffic consists of the IPv6 tunneling enabled by the blackhats for communication. 
3.3.1.1 Day 1 Traffic 
The destination port entropy does not show much activity in the first 9 hours after which 
there is a drastic change in the traffic behavior (refer to Figure 3-2). When we check the 
volume feature, i.e., the total packets in the interval after the 9
th
 hour, it is clear that there 
was a malicious activity after the 9th hour (refer to Figure 3-5). The manual analysis of 
the PCAP trace reveals that the honeypot was probed for a specific vulnerability and then 
compromised during this time. The destination port entropy value first increases; as the 
target machine was probed for vulnerable ports. Then, the specific attack on a vulnerable 
port was launched to access the command line of the target machine. Once the access to 
the shell was obtained, the rootkit was downloaded and installed into the honeypot. This 
is visible as a spike shown in the total packets per interval plot. The packet size entropy 
indicates the different packet sizes visible during the interval in which the attack 
occurred. For example, during a network scan, a constant packet size will be used; and 
during data transfer, there could be packets of smaller and larger sizes. The packet size 
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entropy shows visible changes in the entropy values when the system was compromised 
(refer to Figure 3-6). 
 
Figure 3-2:  Destination Port Entropy in Day1 traffic of Scan28 data set 
 
Figure 3-3: Destination IP entropy of Day1 in Scan 28 data set 
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The destination IP entropy and outdegree show similar behavior but destination IP 
entropy gives a better understanding of the changes in the traffic behavior (refer to Figure 
3-3 and Figure 3-4). 
 
Figure 3-4: Outdegree in Day1 traffic of Scan28 data set 
 
Figure 3-5: Total Packets per Interval in Day1 traffic of Scan28 data set 
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Figure 3-6: Packet Size Entropy in Day1 traffic of Scan28 data set 
The use of different feature distribution helps in understanding the behavior of the 
anomaly. The features that gave a clear indication of anomaly were destination port 
entropy, source port entropy and total payload bytes and total packets. The packet size 
entropy also showed the change in behavior but it does not help in understanding the 
anomaly behavior. 
3.3.1.2 Day 3 traffic 
The day 3 traffic shows less activity in the initial hours, but around the 6th hour the traffic 
pattern changes. The manual analysis of the trace shows that the hacker had initiated an 
IRC connection to an external server. The source port entropy (refer to Figure 3-7) shows 
a drastic increase in the entropy value around the 15th hour. The honeypot was used to 
attack other machines and a detailed analysis shows that a port scan / DoS attack was 
initiated against other machines. During the attack the target machine was probed for 
open ports and different source ports were used to probe the target ports. 
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Figure 3-7: Source Port Entropy in Day3 traffic of Scan28 data set 
The destination IP entropy and outdegree do not give a very clear picture of the changes 
in the traffic. The only variation that can be seen is around the 20th hour where there are 
few peaks. (Refer to Figure 3-8 and Figure 3-9) 
 
Figure 3-8: Destination IP Entropy in Day3 traffic of Scan28 data set 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 5 10 15 20
En
tr
o
p
y
Time (Hour) -------->
Source Port Entropy
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0 5 10 15 20
En
tr
o
p
y
Time (Hours) ---->
Destination IP Entropy
 
 
30 
 
Figure 3-9: Outdegree in Day3 traffic of Scan28 data set 
The total payload bytes show that a large amount of data was transferred after the 15th 
hour and a manual analysis of the trace reveals that a file was transferred to the honeypot 
(refer to Figure 3-10). The dominant features that were helpful in detecting the events in 
the trace were source and destination port entropy, total payload bytes and total packets.  
 
Figure 3-10: Total Payload Bytes Day3 traffic of Scan28 data set 
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3.3.2 Data Set: Scan 14 
This trace is about a Windows NT machine attacked successfully. The attacker exploited 
a vulnerability in Microsoft® Data Access Components (MDAC) that could allow a web 
site visitor to take unauthorized actions on a web site hosted using Internet Information 
Server. The destination IP entropy shows a sudden increase in the entropy during the 
compromise of the target machine (refer to Figure 3-11). 
 
Figure 3-11: Destination IP Entropy for Scan14 challenge 
 
Figure 3-12: Destination Port Entropy for Scan14 challenge 
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The destination port entropy shows a different behavior during the period when the target 
machine was being compromised (refer to Figure 3-12). The volume features: total 
packets and total payload bytes (refer to Figure 3-13 and Figure 3-14) show the intervals 
when large data or files were transferred to the target machine. Both total packets and 
total payload bytes show large variation when some data transfer took place. 
 
Figure 3-13: Total Packets for Scan14 challenge 
 
Figure 3-14: Total Payload Bytes for Scan14 challenge 
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It is clear from these trace that even in a short duration trace it is possible to detect the 
anomalies using the entropy of traffic features and volume features. 
3.3.3 Data Set: Scan 19  
This trace was captured during a Red Hat Linux honeypot compromise. The attacker 
exploited the vulnerability in the wu-ftpd (Washington University FTPD software) 
package. After compromising the machine the attacker used three different modes to 
connect and execute the commands. The destination port entropy (refer to Figure 3-15) 
shows that there was not much traffic for nearly 20 hours and then there is a sudden dip in 
the entropy followed by a sharp increase. The dip in the entropy occurred when the 
attacker tried to exploit the specific vulnerability in the honeypot. The attacker then 
downloaded and installed rootkit programs to the honeypot this based on the peak visible 
in total packets and total payload bytes received (refer to Figure 3-16 and Figure 3-17). 
Later the attacker performed a port scan of the compromised machine.  
 
Figure 3-15: Destination Port Entropy for Scan19 challenge 
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Figure 3-16: Total Packets for Scan19 challenge 
 
Figure 3-17: Total Payload Bytes for Scan19 challenge 
The importance of volume features is clear in this trace as they help in understanding the 
attacker’s behavior during the system exploit. The other parameters like outdegree and 
indegree were not very useful in giving a good understanding of the behavior. 
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3.3.4 Dataset: SSH based Honeypot traffic 
The feature analysis tests were also carried out on a large dataset collected from an SSH 
based honeypot which includes 12 days of traffic. The data set includes mainly SSH 
traffic and an unknown number of anomalies. The traffic includes anomalies such as 
network scans, rootkit file transfers, IRC traffic, etc. 
The destination IP entropy indicates the number of external connections initiated by the 
honeypot (refer to Figure 3-18). The peaks indicate that the honeypot initiated a large 
number of connections during that interval.  The high value of Destination IP entropy 
indicates that the honeypot was scanning the network. The packet size entropy does not 
provide a clear indication of the anomalies in the traffic (refer to Figure 3-19). As a result 
this feature was considered less efficient for the anomaly detection. 
 
Figure 3-18: Destination IP entropy of SSH based honeypot trace 
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Figure 3-19: Packet Size entropy of SSH based honeypot trace 
 
Figure 3-20: Outdegree distribution of SSH based honeypot trace 
The peaks in the Figure 3-20 are due to the network scan activity done by the infected 
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is less clear compared to it. The source IP entropy in Figure 3-21 shows a similar 
behavior as the destination IP entropy. 
 
Figure 3-21: Source IP Entropy distribution of SSH based honeypot trace 
The indegree (refer to Figure 3-22) also does not show all the anomalies and due this 
feature was selected for anomaly detection. 
 
Figure 3-22: Indegree distribution of SSH based honeypot trace 
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Figure 3-23: Destination Port Entropy distribution of SSH based honeypot trace 
The destination port entropy shows the peaks that were visible during anomalies. The port 
scan activity is indicated by the peak at 6.7 days (refer to Figure 3-23). 
 
Figure 3-24: Source Port Entropy distribution of SSH based honeypot trace 
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The source port entropy shows (refer to Figure 3-24) the peaks that occurred during the 
network scan event and this feature along with destination IP entropy help us in 
understanding the network scan anomaly. Based on the analysis of the feature parameters 
of SSH based trace, it is clear that destination IP entropy, source port entropy and 
destination port entropy had better detection capabilities than the other features. Features 
like outdegree could detect only one kind of anomaly (network scan) hence they were 
considered less efficient. 
Volume based features like total payload bytes also helped in understanding the behavior 
and the anomalous events. The Figure 3-25 shows that before the network scan event a 
large data transfer took place. When we manually analyzed the trace we found that this 
was related to a malicious file transfer which was later used to initiate the network scan 
activity. 
 
Figure 3-25: Total Payload Bytes distribution of SSH based honeypot trace 
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Figure 3-26: Packet Count Distribution of SSH based honeypot trace 
The packet count feature (refer to Figure 3-26) also gives better understanding of the 
anomalies. 
3.4 Combining different features to detect anomalies 
Using individual features helps only in detecting certain anomalous events and it does not 
give a clear understanding of the anomaly that occurred. To get a clear understanding of 
the exact events that occurred, we need to look into a combination of features. This is 
useful to detect certain anomalies that were not visible using a single feature. A number 
of combinations of the above listed features were tested to identify the useful feature 
combinations and get a better understanding of the anomaly. 
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Figure 3-27: Combination of Packet Size entropy and Destination IP entropy of SSH based 
honeypot trace 
The combination of packet size entropy and destination IP entropy (refer to Figure 3-27) 
shows that during a network scan activity (high destination IP entropy) a single packet 
size was mostly used which is indicated by the low packet size entropy and high 
destination IP entropy. 
 
Figure 3-28: Destination Port entropy and Destination IP entropy combination of SSH 
honeypot trace 
The destination IP entropy and the destination port entropy show visible groups, i.e., 
clusters, indicating events with similar behaviors. In Figure 3-28 the group with high 
0
5
10
15
20
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
D
es
ti
n
at
io
n
 IP
 E
n
tr
o
p
y
Packet Size Entropy
Packet Size and DstIP Entropy
0
5
10
15
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
D
st
 P
o
rt
 E
n
tr
o
p
y
DstIP entropy
Dst Port Entropy vs Dst IP Entropy
 
 
42 
destination IP entropy and low destination port entropy indicates a network scan where a 
large number of IP addresses are being scanned for similar port. The point with high 
destination port entropy and low destination IP entropy is related to port scan activity. 
 
Figure 3-29: Destination Port entropy and Source IP entropy combination of SSH honeypot 
trace 
The Figure 3-29 shows the combination of destination port entropy and source port 
entropy. This combination almost shows similar behavior as the previous combination of 
destination IP and destination port. The reason for having a similar behavior because the 
source IP entropy showed similar behavior of destination IP entropy as discussed in the 
previous section 3.3.4. 
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Figure 3-30: Destination IP entropy and Source Port entropy combination of SSH honeypot 
trace 
The combination of source port entropy and destination IP entropy (refer to Figure 3-30) 
shows the regions where network scanning took place. The value of the source port 
entropy and destination IP entropy is high which indicates that a network scan activity 
happened and the source machine was using different ports with each connection. The 
manual analysis of this trace reveals that the honeypot was compromised and then a 
malicious file transferred to it, which was later used for scanning the network. 
 
Figure 3-31: Source IP entropy and Source Port entropy combination of SSH honeypot trace 
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The combination of source IP entropy and source port entropy (refer to Figure 3-31) 
shows that during network scan the source IP address was less due to fact that only one IP 
was scanning network. 
 
Figure 3-32: Packet Count and Avg. Payload Size combination of SSH honeypot trace 
The combination of packet count and average payload size shows that during a network 
scan, a large number of packets were used with small payload sizes (refer to Figure 3-32). 
It also seen from the plot that large sized packets were used for transferring malicious 
files to the honeypot. 
Based on the combinations of different features it is clear that different combination of 
features give better understanding of the anomaly behavior instead of just using single 
feature. For example it was found using combinations that during network scan anomaly, 
honeypot was: 
 Scanning various IP addresses 
 Connecting using different ports to the destination IP address 
 Targeting a single port. 
 Sending many packets of small size 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
0 2000000 4000000 6000000 8000000 10000000 12000000A
ve
ra
ge
 P
ay
lo
ad
 B
yt
e
s
Total Payload Bytes
Average Payload Vs Total Payload bytes
 
 
45 
The above findings were deduced based on the different combinations used. In next step 
we try to combine more than one feature (three features) to see if these separate findings 
can be detected by a combination of three features. 
3.5 Combining Three Features to Detect Visible 
Anomalous Groups 
When combining different features, we can see different patterns that can help us detect 
anomalous regions and normal regions. Using three features helps in getting a better 
visualization of the different clusters present in the honeynet data. Also, viewing features 
in three dimensions shows better the behavior of the anomaly as it indicates the variations 
of different features during such anomaly. We performed various tests using different 
combinations of the features to identify those features that provide the best distinction 
between the different clusters or groups in the analyzed data. The combination of source 
IP, destination IP and destination port are shown in Figure 3-33. This combination does 
not show many cluster regions because the source IP entropy and destination IP entropy 
had almost similar behavior. 
 
Figure 3-33: Combination of Destination port, Source IP and Destination IP Entropy values 
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The combination of destination IP entropy, source IP entropy and packet size entropy 
(refer to Figure 3-34) does not show much visible patterns and most of the points are 
concentrated close to destination IP and packet size entropy. 
 
Figure 3-34: Combination of Source IP, Destination IP and Packet Size Entropy Values 
The combination of source port entropy, source IP entropy and destination IP entropy few 
regions that can be related to networks scan activity and bruteforce attempts.(refer to 
Figure 3-35). The biggest cluster is related to the normal traffic where the entropy values 
are in the range of 0 to 3. But this combination does not show certain groups of events 
such as port scan and scanning of honeypot for open IRC channels. 
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Figure 3-35: Combination of Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP entropy values 
 
Figure 3-36: Combination of Destination IP, Destination Port, Source port entropy values 
The combination of source port, destination port, and destination IP entropies shows 
visible clusters; which can be attributed to different anomalous events. In the Figure 3-36, 
cluster 1 in includes a region having entropy values of 0 to 2.8 for all three features. The 
second cluster represents the scanning by the honeypot for different IRC channels. This is 
based on the entropy values and the manual analysis of the trace. In this region the source 
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port entropy is high and the destination IP entropy is also high as the honeypot is 
scanning for different IP addresses. 
The third cluster includes a region where there were bruteforce attempts to log into the 
SSH service running on the honeypot. In this region the source port is high and the 
destination port is low as they are targeting the SSH port. The fourth cluster indicates the 
network scan performed by the honeypot; which scans the SSH port on the destination 
machines using different ports for each connection. The region closer to zero mostly 
represents the IRC traffic as there one or two machine communicating with each other 
using the IRC ports. The detection capabilities of various features are summarized in the 
Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4: Summary of Detection Capabilities of various features 
Traffic Feature Detection Capabilities 
Packet Size Entropy 
Shows good variations but does not help in understanding the 
anomaly. 
Destination IP Entropy 
Shows large variations during specific anomalies and gives good 
indication of anomaly. 
Source IP Entropy 
Shows less variations in the traffic compared to destination IP 
entropy. 
Destination Port 
Entropy 
Shows large variations for various anomalies. 
Source Port Entropy Shows large variations for various anomalies. 
Average Packet Inter-
Arrival Time 
Shows good variations but not very useful in understanding the 
anomaly behavior 
Total Payload Bytes 
Shows good variations during most of the anomalies and when 
used with other features gives good understanding of the anomaly 
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Traffic Feature Detection Capabilities 
Total Packets 
Shows good variations during anomalies and very useful in 
understanding the anomalies. 
Average Payload Size 
Shows good variations during anomalies but does not aid in 
understanding the anomaly behavior. 
The features were first individually analyzed and then various combinations of features 
were compared to identify the best feature combinations that can differentiate between 
normal and abnormal traffic. After testing various combinations, we conclude that the 
combination of destination port entropy, source port entropy, and destination IP entropy 
provide better detection capabilities. On the other hand, the volume features: total payload 
bytes and total packets have better detection capabilities and are very useful in detecting 
certain types of anomalies; which are not detected by traffic features. For example, 
certain malicious files transferred to the honeypot were not detected by the by feature-
based techniques; instead volume-based features detected these events. Therefore, instead 
of just looking at the feature-based techniques, we also need to use the volume-based 
techniques in order to detect most types of anomalies in a Honeynet. 
3.6 Difference between Honeynet Traffic and 
Network Wide Traffic 
The Honeynet traffic is different from any other network wide traffic since the Honeynet 
is not intended to receive any production traffic. Any traffic that enters or leaves the 
Honeynet is suspicious by nature. However, in order to identify malicious activities in the 
Honeynet traffic, we need to perform manual analysis and have expertise in identifying 
such attacks. Due the fact that honeynet traffic is different compared to traffic seen in 
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normal end-user machines, most of other anomaly detection approaches which rely on 
regular network wide traffic are not well suited for this type of traffic [20].  The honeynet 
systems are generally configured with unused IP addresses and generally should not be 
getting any traffic. Therefore, most of the traffic that honeynets will receive is due to 
probes or malwares or due to other problems in the network. However, traffic collected 
from other machines connected to the network will be getting traffic from different 
sources and will require different parameters and techniques to identify malicious events.  
The difference between the Honeynet traffic and the network wide traffic can be 
understood by comparing the Honeynet traffic collected from honeypots and the DARPA 
99 [28] traffic dataset. For instance, In the Honeynet traffic, most of the conversation is 
between the honeypot and other machines while this is not the case for the network wide 
traffic such as the one present in DARPA 99. Figure 3-37 shows that most of the IP 
conversations have the honeypot IP as a common endpoint. 
 
Figure 3-37: IP conversations – Honeynet Traffic 
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In contrast, the network wide traffic of DARPA 99 has many different IP addresses that 
are communicating with each other as seen in Figure 3-38. 
 
Figure 3-38: IP conversations – DARPA99 Dataset 
In addition, comparing the entropy values for different features gives a better idea of the 
difference in these types of traffic. Figure 3-39 shows the normal day traffic in terms of 
destination port entropy in the honeynet traffic when no attacks were seen in the collected 
trace. 
 
Figure 3-39: Destination Port Entropy – Normal Honeynet Traffic 
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Figure 3-40 shows the destination port entropy seen from one of the IP addresses in the 
network wide traffic with no attacks. This shows that even during normal traffic, period 
peaks are visible. This indicates that the threshold levels in these two types of traffic are 
different and therefore the same levels cannot be used in both cases to detect anomalies. 
The reason for this is that our technique considers any traffic coming to honeypots as 
malicious while in the production machines not all traffic is malicious. 
 
Figure 3-40: Destination Port Entropy – Normal DARPA99 Dataset Traffic 
Figure 3-39 and Figure 3-40 also show the difference between honeynet traffic and traffic 
collected from normal machines. In honeynet traffic, some of the peaks shown in Figure 
3-40 would indicate malicious activities, but in this case, normal traffic in the DARPA 99 
dataset has peaks which could be due to some user sessions. 
The network wide traffic collected during attacks also shows that different production 
machines in the network get different types of traffic. Figure 3-41 and Figure 3-42 show 
the variation of destination port entropies seen from two different IP addresses. 
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Figure 3-41: Destination Port Entropy IP1 – Attack Traffic DARPA99 dataset 
 
Figure 3-42: Destination Port Entropy IP2 – Attack Traffic DARPA99 dataset 
Figure 3-43 shows the variation of the destination port entropy for the entire trace 
containing attacks. The behavior of the network traffic is different compared to the traffic 
of individual machines. Therefore, to detect anomalies in this type of traffic, a different 
algorithm has to be designed; and our proposed technique is not suitable for such traffic 
types. 
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Figure 3-43: Destination Port Entropy – Entire Trace: Attack Traffic DARPA99 dataset 
3.7 Detecting Anomalies 
Anomalies are generally identified by distinguishing between normal and abnormal 
behavior. In entropy based systems, small variation in the values of traffic feature results 
in low entropy and large variation results in high entropy value. Detecting anomalies also 
involves the tracking of significant changes in the traffic volume.  It is also identified that 
tracking significant variation in entropy is very useful to identify the presence of an 
anomaly in the traffic dataset [29]. 
In our proposed approach, anomalies are identified using the five selected features. The 
classification between normal and abnormal traffic is done using the variations in the 
corresponding features. For example in Honeynet network during normal behavior very 
less variations are seen (Refer Table 3-5). However there are significant traffic changes 
during the presence of anomalies. (Refer to Table 3-6) Based on a through manual 
analysis of the test data sets we found that during normal traffic, entropy based features 
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had an entropy variation in the range of 0 and 3. Similarly for volume-based features 
variations were in the range of 0 to 3000 bytes for total payload bytes and 0 to 50 packets 
for total packet count. 
Table 3-5: Normal Traffic Values Range 
DIP DP SP TB PC 
0 1.31 1.31 228 6 
1 1.52 0.98 444 4 
0 1.87 2.04 2631 20 
1 0.918 1.58 3 1 
0 1.62 0.33 168 8 
Table 3-6: Abnormal Traffic Values Range 
DIP DP SP TB PC 
0.52 3.56 4.46 12118 152 
0 3.22 4.20 13971 138 
0 3.37 3.61 70497 185 
17.14 0.67 14.33 141048 5702 
16.87 0.677 14.36 181988 7023 
0.419 11.55 11.53 374099 4152 
0.218 12.26 12.26 214096 5374 
Apart from the anomaly detection threshold the entropy values and volume changes can 
be used to define various thresholds levels. These levels can be used for identifying the 
behavior of anomalies in the Honeynet traffic.  
Very High Entropy or Very High Volume: This level is used for high entropy values 
and high volume of data. Based on the tests made on the traces only few anomalies 
(network Scan and Port Scan) had high entropy values. The entropy values greater than 7 
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are considered as very high entropy. Volume changes greater than 500KB and packet 
count greater than 2000 packets are considered very high volume change. 
High Entropy and High Volume: This level is used for entropy values that lie between 5 
and 7. Based on the experimental results it can be understood that certain anomaly types 
like bruteforce attacks or fuzzers result in high entropy values. The reason for certain 
anomalies to have high entropy is due to fact that they initiate too many connections from 
different ports to crack the passwords or the vulnerability of different applications. 
Volume changes between 50kb and 500kb as well as packet count between 500 to 2000 
packets are considered high volume change. 
Medium Entropy and Medium Volume:  This is used for entropy values that are greater 
than the normal range and less than the high entropy.  The entropy values that lie between 
3 and 5 are considered medium. Most of anomalies lie in this range as they cause enough 
changes in the entropy values to cross the normal range. The reason is that most of 
anomalies target specific ports and hence make do not require port scans and hence the 
entropy values are slightly less compared to high entropy. Volume changes between 3kb 
and 50kb as well as packet count between 50 to 500 packets are considered medium 
volume change. 
Zero entropy value: This entropy value is used for cases during which only one 
dominant feature value is present in the trace. For example if only one destination IP is 
visible during the five minute interval then an entropy value of zero is recorded. This 
level is used only for feature-based parameters and not applicable to volume-based 
parameters. Also the situation in which this level is considered anomaly is when there is 
zero entropy for the three feature-based parameters and there is medium volume change. 
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3.8 Anomaly Behavior Detection 
It is essential to analyze the behavior of the various anomalies detected in the training 
data sets after having already defined the needed features to detect such anomalies. Such 
an analysis of the behavior of the various anomalies detected will help in recommending a 
behavior pattern for a detected anomaly type. Hence, this section presents the various 
entropy value ranges that were recorded for different anomaly types found in the training 
data sets. These entropy values were used to understand the behavior of the anomalies 
and to recommend a behavior pattern for a detected anomaly type. The behavior pattern is 
recommended using the five features that were selected for anomaly detection. The 
entropy values that were recorded in the presence of an anomaly are presented in Table 
3-7 to  
Table 3-10. It is presented as a range because the anomaly is recorded over multiple 
intervals and hence produces many entropy values during the anomaly. The entropy 
values for malicious file download as they did not show any significant changes in all the 
case and were in the normal region; hence they are omitted in tables below and are 
marked with X. 
Table 3-7: Anomalies detected in Scan 28 Trace 
Anomaly Type 
Dst IP 
Entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source 
Port 
entropy 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packet 
Count 
System 
Compromise 
0 to 2.2 
2.02 to 
2.988 
2.02 to 
3.11 
4547 to 742346 22 to 1491 
Malicious file 
download 
X X X 
392336 to 
742346 
753 to 1491 
IRC 0 to 2.5 Many 0 Many 0 6200 to 19048 10 to 97 
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communication 
Day 1 
points 
1 to 2.5 
points 
1 to 2.6 
IRC 
Communication 
Day 3 
0 0 0 1657 to 8652 15 to 75 
ICMP (DDos) 0.721 to 3.4 0 to 1.38 0 to 1.63 6348 to 16177 6 to 58 
Port Scan / Dos 
Attack 
Day 1 
0 to 0.91 
7.09 to 
8.685 
6.95 to 
9.81 
153112 to 
764302 
406 to 3197 
Port Scan/Dos 
Day 3 
0 to 0.39 
4.99 to 
7.424 
5.29 to 
9.61 
56066 to 169238 674 to 2773 
Table 3-8: Anomalies detected in Scan 14 trace 
Anomaly Type 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packet 
Count 
System 
Compromise 
0 to 1.84 3.15 to 3.56 
3.065 to 
4.465 
12118 to 13971 138 to 152 
Malicious File 
download 
X X X 16805 to 70497 145 to 185 
Running various 
commands 
0 to 1.95 0 to 2.71 1 to 3.85 1312 to 8638 45 to 116 
Table 3-9: Anomalies detected in Scan 19 trace 
Anomaly 
Type 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packet 
Count 
System 
compromise 
0.9893 1.8078 2.159 1191 to 13145 33 to 102 
Malicious file 
download 
X X X 374099 4152 
Port scan 
0.218 to 
0.419 
11.5 to 
12.263 
11.53 to 
12.26 
214096 5374 
 
 
 
59 
Table 3-10: Anomalies detected in SSH based Honeypot trace 
Anomaly Type 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packet 
Count 
ICMP flood 1.584 0 0 14372 to 56636 14 to 55 
Malicious file 
download 
X X X 103512 to 1271603 
1727 
 
Network Scan 
16.87 to 
17.14 
0.0370.6
7 
14.3 
117906 to 
10677114 
1603 to 
163519 
Bruteforce 0 to 1.4 0 to 4.39 3.98 to 6.53 29680 to 76402 494 to 1947 
IRC 
Conversations 
0 to1.58 0 to 1.79 0 to 1.78 26263 to 10660 229 to 249 
Port scan 
2.00 to 
4.91 
4.51 to 
5.877 
3.66 to 5.94 15289 154 
Honeypot 
Scanning for 
IRC channels 
3.33 to 
3.91 
4.54 to 
5.33 
4.47 to 7.24 17505 to 175470 254 to 2566 
3.8.1 Anomaly Behavior 
The anomaly behavior is recommended based on the values detected for the selected 
features. Based on the analysis of the various training data sets that will be presented next 
it was found that not all the features are required to define the behavior of all the 
anomalies. Certain anomalies can be defined using just two or three features while others 
require all the features. The reason for this is that certain anomalies such as the ICMP 
flood anomaly are independent of specific features such as port entropies that do not 
pertain to such anomalies. Accordingly, certain features have values in the normal range 
in all instances of the same anomaly in different training data sets due to which they do 
not aid in identifying that anomaly.  
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The following set of tables summarizes the analysis of the behavior of all the anomalies 
based on the various training data sets. It should be noted that the feature that was 
considered less important to define the behavior of the anomaly is grayed out in the 
corresponding tables. The values recorded for the system compromise event from the 
different training data sets is shown in Table 3-11. Based on the recorded values it can be 
concluded that the behavior of the system compromise anomaly is Medium Destination 
Port Entropy, Medium Source Port Entropy, High Total Payload Bytes, and Medium 
Total Packet Count. In this case, the destination IP entropy is less significant because 
during the system compromise there is only one target machine being exploited and hence 
there is no significant change in the entropy values. 
Table 3-11: Anomaly Type:  System Compromise 
Trace 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total 
Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packet 
Count 
Scan 28 0 to 2.2 2.02 to 2.988 2.02 to 3.11 
4547 to 
742346 
22 to 1491 
Scan 14 0 to 1.84 3.15 to 3.56 
3.065 to 
4.465 
12118 to 
70497 
138 to 185 
Scan 19 0.9893 1.8078 2.159 
1191 to 
13145 
33 to 102 
SSH-based 
Honeypot 
1.222 2.089 2.077 343184 385 
Table 3-12  shows the values recorded for malicious file downloads in different training 
data sets. Based on these values the behavior of malicious file download can be defined as 
Very High Total Packet Bytes, High Packet Count. Note that the entropy values are 
omitted from Table 3-12 as they did not show any significant changes in the different 
training data sets and were in the normal range. The reason for this is that during the 
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malicious file downloads; there is no significant change in the entropy values since most 
of the communication occurs between two machines using specific ports, i.e., FTP, 
HTTP, etc. 
Table 3-12: Anomaly Type: Malicious File Download 
Trace 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source 
Port 
entropy 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packet 
Count 
Scan 28    392336 to 742346 
753 to 
1491 
Scan 14    16805 to 70497 145 to 185 
Scan 19    374099 4152 
SSH-based Honeypot    103512 to 1271603 1727 
Table 3-13 shows the values recorded during the IRC communication noticed in the 
different training data sets. Based on these values the behavior of the IRC 
communications can be defined as Zero Destination IP entropy, Zero Destination Port 
entropy, Zero Source Port entropy, Medium Total Payload bytes, and Medium Total 
Packet Count. 
Table 3-13: Anomaly Type: IRC communication 
Trace 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total 
Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packet 
Count 
Scan 28 0 to 2.5 
Many 0 
points 
1 to 2.5 
Many 0 
points 
1 to 2.6 
6200 to 
19048 
10 to 97 
SSH based 
honeypot  
0 to 1.58 0 to 1.79 0 to 1.78 
26263 to 
10660 
229 to 249 
Scan 28 0 0 0 
1657 to 
8652 
15 to 75 
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Table 3-14 shows the various values recorded during the ICMP flood anomaly. The 
values indicate the anomaly behavior as High Total Payload Bytes and Medium Total 
Packet Count. The reason that this anomaly does not cause any changes to port entropies 
is that ICMP is a layer 3 protocol and does not include the ports that are used by layer 4 
protocols. 
Table 3-14: Anomaly Type: ICMP flood 
Trace 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source 
Port 
entropy 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packet 
Count 
Scan 28 
0.721 to 
3.4 
0 to 1.38 0 to 1.63 6348 to 16177 6 to 58 
SSH based honeypot 1.584 0 0 14372 to 56636 14 to 55 
 
Table 3-15 shows the values recorded during the port scan anomaly. Based on the values 
the behavior of port scan anomaly can be defined as Very High Destination Port Entropy, 
Very High Source Port entropy, High Total Payload Bytes, and Very High Packet Count. 
Since this anomaly basically scans the ports on the target machine, it is independent from 
the Destination IP entropy. 
Table 3-15: Anomaly Type: Port Scan 
Trace 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total 
Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packet 
Count 
Scan 28 0 to 0.91 7.09 to 8.685 6.95 to 9.81 
153112 to 
764302 
406 to 
3197 
Scan 28 0 to 0.39 4.99 to 7.424 5.29 to 9.61 
56066 to 
169238 
674 to 
2773 
Scan 19 0.218 to 0.419 11.5 to 12.263 11.53 to 12.26 214096 5374 
SSH based trace 2.00 to 4.91 4.51 to 5.877 3.66 to 5.94 15289 154 
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Table 3-16 shows the variation of different features during the network scan anomaly. 
Based on the recorded values the network scan behavior can be defined as Very High 
Destination IP entropy, Very High source Port Entropy, High Total Payload Bytes, and 
Very High Total Packet Count. Note that the network scan involves the scanning of a 
large number of IP addresses, and, therefore, it is independent of the Destination Port 
entropy. 
Table 3-16: Anomaly Type: Network Scan 
Trace 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total 
Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packet 
Count 
SSH based 
honeypot 
16.87 to 
17.14 
0.037 to 0.67 10.97 to 14.3 
117906 to 
10677114 
1603 to 
163519 
 
Table 3-17 shows the variation of the different parameters recorded during the bruteforce 
anomaly. Based on these values the behavior of the bruteforce anomaly can be defined as 
Medium Destination port entropy, High Source Port Entropy, High Total Payload Bytes, 
and Medium Total packet count. During bruteforce attempts, most of the communication 
occurs between two machines and hence it does not cause significant changes in the 
destination IP entropy. 
Table 3-17: Anomaly Type: Bruteforce 
Trace 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total 
Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packet 
Count 
SSH based 
honeypot 
0 to 1.4 0 to 4.39 3.98 to 6.53 
29680 to 
76402 
494 to 
1947 
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Table 3-18 lists the various anomalies and their associated behavior in terms of different 
features. Indentifying the behavior of different anomalies will help in detecting similar 
anomalies in other data sets. Using a large number of data sets will help in defining the 
behavior of the anomaly better. This information can then be used to detect similar 
anomalies by comparing the behavior to the listed behavior. 
Table 3-18: Behavior of Different Anomaly Types 
Anomaly 
Dst IP 
entropy 
Dst Port 
Entropy 
Source Port 
entropy 
Total 
Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packet 
Count 
System 
Compromise 
 M M H M 
Malicious File 
Download 
   VH H 
IRC 
communications 
Z Z Z M M 
ICMP flood    H M 
Port Scan  VH VH H VH 
Network Scan VH  VH H VH 
BruteForce  M H M H 
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter provided detailed information on the different data sets used for testing the 
features. Various features were tested for the detection capability and then the best 
features that provided better detection capability were shortlisted. The combinations of 
different features were also tested to identify the behavior of the anomalies and based on 
the results the best combination was identified. The values recorded for different features 
were then utilized to define the anomaly behavior. 
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Chapter 4 
4 
Results 
This chapter focuses on the results and discussions of the detection technique proposed in 
Chapter 3. The main sections of this chapter include the results obtained from the traces 
that were used to test the proposed technique and to determine its efficiency. 
4.1 Experimental Setup 
The evaluation of the proposed technique was carried out by developing Java code for 
extracting entropy values from the traces. The jNetPcap Java API was used for 
developing the code to read the PCAP trace files and then the entropy values for every 
five minute interval were calculated for different features. The results were then plotted 
using the features mentioned in Chapter 3. The traffic features that were selected were: 
Destination IP Entropy (DIP), Destination Port Entropy (DP), and Source Port Entropy 
(SP).  The volume features that were selected are: Total Payload Bytes (TB), Total 
Packets Count (PC). 
The trace files that were used for obtaining the results are: 
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 SSH based honeypot: trace taken from the Information Security Visualization 
Contest - hack.lu 2009 [26] 
 Scan 27: Honeynet.org Scan of the Month Challenge, March 2003. 
 Trace having Synthetic Anomalies: Anomalies inserted using penetration testing 
tools provided in BackTrac 4.1 [30] 
 Dionaea capture trace: this trace was collected from the KFUPM network. 
4.2 Description of Traces Used 
4.2.1 SSH Honetpot Trace 
SSH-based honeypot trace was collected from the Information Security Visualization 
Contest - hack.lu 2009 [26]. The details of this trace are summarized in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: SSH based honeypot trace details 
Attributes Values 
Trace Name SSH Honeypot Trace 
Source Information Security Visualization Contest - hack.lu 2009 
Duration 12 days 
Format PCAP trace file 
Size 708 Megabytes 
Number of Packets 4323191 
Average Packet Size 155.68 Bytes 
Figure 4-1 represents the total packets distribution of different transport layer protocols 
which shows a domination of TCP packets.  As this trace is from an SSH based honeypot 
most of the packets were SSH packets as shown in Figure 4-2. This trace also has a large 
number of IRC packets which indicates that an IRC channel was running in the honeypot. 
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Figure 4-1: Packet Distributions of Transport Protocols 
 
Figure 4-2: Packets Distribution of TCP Protocols 
The results were collected by running the Java code to extract the entropy values for the 
selected features and then 3-D plots were generated to determine the anomalies. 
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4.2.2 Scan 27 Honeynet.org: Scan of Month Challenge 
This trace was collected from Honeynet.org which releases the Scan of the Month 
Challenge [25]. This trace was collected by the Azusa Pacific University Honeynet 
Project team from an un-patched Windows 2000 honeypot. The details of this trace are 
provided in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2: Scan 27 trace details 
Attributes Values 
Trace Name Scan 27 
Source Honeynet.org, Scan of the Month Challenge 
Duration 5 Days 
Format PCAP trace file 
Size 17.6 Megabytes 
Number of Packets 54536 
Average Packet Size 316.25 Bytes 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Packet Distribution of TCP protocols 
The trace was dominated by HTTP and IRC packets as shown in Figure 4-3. 
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4.2.3 Lab Trace with Synthetic Anomalies 
The third trace that was used for evaluating the detection technique was generated in the 
Lab setup within KFUPM. A honeynet was setup with Honeywall - a high interaction 
honeypot and Windows XP honeypot. The BackTrack 4.1 operating system was used as 
the attacker machine, which was used to attack the windows XP honeypot with different 
types of attacks. The honeypot was made visible on the network and popular services 
were activated on it such as IIS web server, FTP server, SSH server etc. The main tools 
that were used from the BackTrack operating system were: 
 Nmap 
 Open VAS vulnerability scanner 
 Metasploit Penetration Testing Framework 3.0 
Metasploit Framework [31] is one of the most popular open source penetration testing 
tools that are available in the market [32]. 
We used these tools to generate a trace that includes different types of malicious activities 
and then used our technique to test whether it can detect these anomalies. Metasploit 
framework has been used by other authors to generate a similar data set for their anomaly 
detection techniques. Laskov and Kloft [33] have used the metasploit framework to create 
a malicious dataset by generating various exploits from the tool. Rieck, and Laskov [34] 
have also used the metasploit framework to create a malicious dataset. They used various 
exploits from this framework which are shown in Figure 4-4. Düssel et al [35] also used 
the metasploit framework to generate malicious dataset for testing their anomaly 
detection technique. 
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Figure 4-4: Exploits used for generating malicious dataset [34] 
The attacks that were generated in our experiment are listed in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3:Attacks generated against the honeypot 
Categories Types of Attacks 
Port Scan 
NMAP regular scan 
NMAP quick scan 
NMAP intense scan 
NMAP slow comprehensive scan 
Vulnerability Scanning Open VAS Scanner 
Database attacks 
MYSQL login utility scanner 
MYSQL database access attempts  
Server Message Block 
(SMB) protocol attacks 
SMB Negotiate Dialect Corruption 
(Fuzzers/smb/smb_negotiate_corrupt) 
Microsoft Workstation Service 
NetAddAlternateComputerName Overflow 
Microsoft Server Service Relative Path Stack Corruption 
Microsoft Server Service NetpwPathCanonicalize Overflow 
Microsoft Plug and Play Service Overflow 
Microsoft Print Spooler Service Impersonation Vulnerability 
DCE/RPC, (Distributed Endpoint Mapper Service Discovery 
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Categories Types of Attacks 
Computing Environment / 
Remote Procedure Calls) 
attacks 
(scanner/dcerpc/endpoint_mapper) 
DCERPC TCP Service Auditor 
Microsoft RPC DCOM Interface Overflow exploit 
Microsoft Message Queueing Service Path Overflow exploit 
FTP 
Simple FTP Fuzzer 
FTP attack access gain attempt 
HTTP IIS web server 
attacks 
Microsoft IIS WebDAV Writ exploit 
Microsoft IIS 5.0 Printer exploit 
Microsoft IIS/PWS CGI Fil exploit 
Microsoft IIS 5.0 WebDAV ntdll.dll Path Overflow 
SMTP attacks MS03-046 Exchange 2000 XEXCH50 Heap Overflow exploit 
SNMP attacks Network Node Manager Snmp.exe CGI Buffer Overflow 
Backdoor Energizer DUO Trojan Code Execution 
SSH attacks SSH Key Exchange Init Corruption 
Table 4-4 summarizes the trace details that were used to validate the results. 
Table 4-4: Lab – Trace Details 
Attributes Values 
Trace Name Lab -Trace 
Source 
Generated in lab environment in a High Interaction honeypot 
setup 
Duration 22 Days 
Format PCAP trace file 
Size 30 Megabytes 
Number of Packets 312599 
Average Packet Size 85.181 bytes 
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Figure 4-5: Packets Distribution of TCP Protocols 
 
Figure 4-6: Packet Distribution of UDP Protocols 
Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 show the packet distributions of TCP and UDP protocols. The 
plots show the different types of applications that were targeted in the honeypot. 
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4.2.4 Dionaea Capture Trace 
A low interaction honeypot Dionaea was setup and connected in the KFUPM network. 
The trace was collected for two separate days and our proposed anomaly detection 
technique was used to detect anomalies in the traffic. The trace details are as given in 
Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5:Dionaea capture trace details 
Attributes Values 
Trace Name Dionaea Capture Trace 
Source Low interaction honeypot setup in KFUPM 
Duration 2 days 
Format PCAP trace file (two separate PCAP files) 
Size 15.6 Megabytes and 648 kilobytes 
Number of Packets Day1 154173 packets, Day3: 3722 
Average Packet Size 316.25 Bytes 
4.3 Results 
In this section the results of the detection technique are presented. The detection results 
for the traces discussed in the previous section are presented in detail in this section. The 
results are comprised of anomalies that were detected using the proposed technique, as 
well as the anomaly detection rate and corresponding plots. The efficiency of the anomaly 
behavior detection was presented using recall and precision metrics. The main plots that 
are presented in the results are the 3-D cluster plot and the two volume feature plots. The 
three features used for the 3-D plots are the Destination IP Entropy (DIP), Destination 
Port Entropy (DP) and Source Port Entropy (SP). The features used for volume feature 
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plots are the Total Payload Bytes (TB) and Total Packet Count (PC). In addition to this 
the K-means cluster plot and the time-based view of the cluster plot are presented here. 
Two levels of anomaly detection were used in this work. The two levels include: 
 The first level to detect anomalies based on the threshold levels defined (refer to 
section 3.6) 
 The second level to identify the type of anomaly based on the behavior predicted. 
(refer to section 3.8.1) 
 The anomalies were detected based on the threshold levels defined in the previous 
chapter. The threshold levels used are: 
 Very High Entropy / Very High Volume (volume includes both total payload 
bytes and total packet count) 
 High Entropy / High Volume 
 Medium Entropy / Medium Volume 
 Zero Entropy ( this level is considered an anomaly only when there is substantial 
volume change; otherwise it will be considered as normal) 
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4.3.1 SSH Honeypot Trace 
 
Figure 4-7:  Clusters plot for SSH based honeypot trace 
The cluster plot in Figure 4-7 shows the distribution of entropy values for the three 
selected features. The large variations and widely scattered points indicate different types 
of network events captured in the trace.  
 
Figure 4-8: Cluster plot for SSH based honeypot: from another angle 
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Viewing the cluster plot from a different angle (refer to Figure 4-8 ) shows a better view 
of the positions of various points in the 3-D space. The anomalies were detected using 
both feature-based parameters and volume-based parameters. The volume plots of total 
payload bytes and total packet count are shown in Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10. The visible 
peaks in these plots correspond to certain events in the network traffic and were used to 
detect the anomalies in the trace. 
 
Figure 4-9: Total Payload Bytes in SSH Honeypot Trace 
 
Figure 4-10: Total Packet Count in SSH Honeypot Trace 
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The plots also show the behavior of certain events in the trace, such as the behaviors 
during malicious file transfers and during a network scan. 
4.3.1.1 Types of Anomalies Detected 
The anomalies are detected based on the entropy values collected by running the Java 
code. The threshold levels mentioned in the beginning of the section were used to detect 
anomalies in the traffic. A manual analysis is carried out to identify the actual anomaly 
type. The detected behavior is also compared with the predicted behavior (refer to Table 
3-18) to identify the correctness of the predicted behavior. 
Table 4-6 : Categories of anomalies detected 
Detected Behavior 
Type of Anomaly 
(by Manual Analysis) 
Description 
TB(VH), PC(H) Malicious File downloads 
Many malicious files were 
downloaded to the honeypot like: 
delles.tar.gz, z.jpg,  
crazyloop.tgz, ralph.tgz 
TB (H), PC (M) ICMP flood 
Too Many Large Sized ICMP  
packets sent to honeypot 
DIP (VH), SP(VH), 
TB(H), PC(VH) 
Network Scan looking for 
open SSH ports 
Honeypot was compromised by 
many hackers and after downloading 
some malicious file a network scan 
was performed. Many Network scan 
activities were detected. 
DP (M), SP(H), TB(M), 
PC(H) 
SSH BruteForce attack 
A large number of SSH brute force 
attempts were made on the honeypot 
to gain the shell access. 
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DIP (Z), DP(Z), SP(Z), 
TB(M), PC(M) 
Many IRC conversations 
Many IRC conversations visible. 
This was detected when too many 
messages were being exchanged. 
DP (VH), SP(VH),  
TB(H), PC(VH) 
Port Scan 
The honeypot was scanned for 
different open ports from different IP 
addresses 
DIP (M), DP(M),SP(H), 
TB(H), PC(H) 
Vulnerability Scan by 
Honeypot 
After the Honeypot was 
compromised a malicious file was 
transferred (crazyloop) after which 
the honeypot scanned various 
machines for open IRC channels 
A total of 41 anomalies which fall in the categories mentioned in Table 4-6 were detected 
in this trace. The actual number of anomalies present in this trace is unknown as it is not 
available from the source of this trace file. We also did not find any existing analysis 
done on this trace to confirm the number of anomalies present. K-means clustering was 
further used to detect different cluster regions with in the traffic. 
 
Figure 4-11: K-means Cluster Plot for SSH based honeypot trace 
 
 
79 
The k-means cluster plot in Figure 4-11 shows the different clusters that are available for 
the entropy values recorded for the SSH based honeypot trace. Figure 4-12 shows the 
time based view of these clusters and helps in visualizing the sequence of events that took 
place. Figure 4-12 shows the events based on the time of occurrence and separate markers 
were used for each of the 12 days of traffic. 
 
Figure 4-12: Time based view of network events using different markers and colors for each 
day 
Percentage Detection Rate: not applicable, because this trace was used in the test data set 
and the actual number of anomalies in the trace is unknown. 
4.3.2 Scan 27: Scan of the Month Challenge 
The detection results for the scan of the month trace (Scan 27) are presented in this 
section. The main plots that were used to detect anomalies are the cluster plots and 
volume-based parameters plots. The three feature cluster plot of destination IP entropy, 
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destination port entropy and source port entropy is show in Figure 4-13. The honeypot 
was exposed to a large number of attacks as seen by the wide spread entropy values in 
Figure 4-13. Many attackers had tried to compromise the honeypot and some worm 
activity was also detected in the trace. 
 
Figure 4-13: Cluster plot for Scan 27 
The points having high entropy values were due to some port scan activity. The volume 
plots in Figure 4-14 and Figure 4-15 also confirm the transfer of malicious files to the 
honeypot. The points with low entropy values close to zero correspond to the IRC traffic 
that was caused as the honeypot was connected to the IRC network by one of the 
attackers. 
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Figure 4-14: Total Payload Bytes for scan 27 trace 
Most of successful system compromise attacks were seen after the third day which 
correspond to the peaks shown in Figure 4-15 and the after a successful system 
compromise, the honeypot was connected to an IRC network. 
 
Figure 4-15: Total Packet Count for Scan 27 trace 
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4.3.2.1 Types of Anomalies Detected 
Table 4-7 : Anomalies detected in Scan27 trace 
Detected 
Behavior 
Type of Anomaly (by 
Manual Analysis) 
Anomaly Behavior 
Detected by Reverse 
Mapping 
Actual  
number 
Occurrences 
Reported [by 
Honeynet.org] 
TB(M), PC(M) 
(5 occurrences) 
SMB attacks 
The detected behavior not 
available in the known 
behavior set. [refer to 
Table 3-18] 
5 occurrence 
reported 
DP(M), SP(M), 
TB(H), PC(M) 
1 occurrence 
Buffer overflow attempt and 
System Compromise 
Many attempts were made to 
compromise the honeypot. 
System Compromise 
1 occurrence 
reported 
TB(VH), PC(H) 
1 occurrence 
Malicious file download  
\System32\\PSEXESVC.EX
E , \\System32\\inst.exe 
Malicious File Download 1 occurrence 
DP (VH), 
SP(VH), 
TB(M), PC(M) 
1 occurrence 
Port Scan 
Honeypot was scanned for 
open ports. 
The detected behavior 
does not match any of the 
predicted behavior 
1 occurrence 
DP(M), SP(M), 
TB(H), PC(H) 
1 occurrence 
 HTML script kiddies 
This attack tries to scan the 
IIS web server for 
vulnerabilities and this is 
done by initiating automated 
HTML scripts 
The detected behavior not 
available in the known 
behavior set. 
1 occurrence 
IIS web server 
attack 
TB(M) 
1 occurrence 
Attempts to exploit buffer 
overflow in indexing service. 
The detected behavior not 
available in the known 
behavior set. 
1 occurrence 
CodeRed II 
worm 
DIP (Z) , IRC communications IRC communication 1 occurrence 
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DP(Z), SP(Z), 
TB(M) PC(M) 
1 occurrence 
IRC communication initiated 
on Honeypot by the attacker. 
Not Detected X X 
Slammer 
Worm, 1 
occurrence 
Total Detected 
= 11 
  
Total 
Reported = 12 
Anomaly Detection Rate 91.6% 
 
A total of 11 anomalous events which fall in the categories mentioned in Table 4-7, were 
detected using the proposed technique. Honeynet.org reported 12 anomalous events in 
this scan of the month challenge. The anomaly that was undetected represent attacks on 
MS-SQL server UDP port 1434 which resembled the slammer worm. A total of 55 
packets were sent to the honeypot targeting the port 1434 but these packets were sent at 
different times during the five days period. The reason for this not getting detected is that 
the time gap between these packets was large and did not cause rapid change in entropy. 
Based on the detection results, a detection rate of 91.6% was achieved using the proposed 
technique. 
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Figure 4-16: K-Means cluster plot for Scan 27 trace 
The K-means cluster plot shows (refer to Figure 4-16) the main clusters detected in the 
trace. K-means enabled the detection of three clusters. The cluster marked with * 
represents the normal traffic region and most of the traffic falls in this cluster. The time 
view plot in Figure 4-17 displays the spread of events throughout the five day period. It is 
clear from this plot that system compromise attempt happened on third day and the port 
scan and other anomalies occurred on the fourth day. 
 
Figure 4-17: Time based view of events for Scan 27 trace 
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4.3.3 Lab Trace with Synthetic Anomalies 
The lab trace was used to test the effectiveness of the proposed technique. In this trace 
synthetic anomalies were injected using various tools used for penetration testing. The 
most popular tools that were used are: NMAP, OpenVAS scanner and Metasploit. The 
Metasploit tool was used to generate system exploits which target various services on the 
honeypot. The attacks were generated five days after the honeypot was connected to the 
Internet. In this lab trace, 27 anomalies were inserted (refer to Table 4-3 for the list of 
inserted anomalies). But, as this honeypot was connected to the Internet other attacks 
were also detected. The cluster plot in Figure 4-18 shows various groups of anomalous 
activities. 
 
Figure 4-18: Cluster view of Labtrace 
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The volume based parameters also show significant changes during the anomalies as seen 
in Figure 4-19 and Figure 4-20. The peaks correspond to scanners and malicious data 
transfers. 
 
Figure 4-19: Total Payload Bytes in Labtrace 
 
Figure 4-20: Packet Count for Labtrace 
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4.3.3.1 Types of Anomalies Detected 
Table 4-8 : Categories of Anomalies detected in LabTrace 
Detected 
Behavior 
Type of Anomaly by 
Manual Analysis 
Anomaly Behavior 
by Reverse Mapping 
Reported 
Number of 
Occurrences 
(Refer to Table 
4-3) 
DP (VH), 
SP(VH), TB(H), 
PC(VH) 
5 Occurrences 
Port Scan 
Different NMAP port scan 
types were used to scan the 
honeypot. The 
comprehensive scan shows 
the highest entropy value 
and the highest number of 
packets were sent in this 
type of scan. 
Port Scan 5 occurrences 
DP(VH), SP(VH), 
TB(H), PC (VH) 
1 occurrence 
Vulnerability Scanning 
Vulnerability scanning 
using Open VAS Scanner 
Port Scan 1 occurrence 
DP(M), SP(M), 
TB(H), PC(M) 
12 occurrences 
Vulnerability exploits 
(Metasploit exploits) 
These are system 
compromise attempts 
System Compromise 12 occurrences 
TB (H), PC(M) 
3 occurrences 
System Compromise ICMP flood 3 occurrences 
DP (M), SP(H), 
TB(M), PC(H) 
4 occurrences 
Password Brute force and 
Fuzzers 
These attacks used various 
combinations of username 
and passwords to guess the 
account password. The 
fuzzer tools fall in this 
category. 
Bruteforce 4 occurrences 
 
 
88 
DP(M), TB(M), 
PC(M) 
24 occurrence 
SMB connection attempts 
Most of these attempts try 
to connect to the Microsoft-
ds port (445) on the remote 
machine and try to gain 
access to the system shares. 
Detected behavior not 
available in the known 
behavior set 
X 
Not Detected X X 
SSH attack and 
Microsoft 
Message 
Queueing Service 
Path Overflow 
exploit 
2 occurrences 
Total Anomalies 
Detected = 25 
  
Total Anomalies 
Reported = 27 
Anomaly Detection Rate 92.5% 
 
The major categories of anomalies that were detected in the Labtrace are listed in Table 
4-8. A total of 27 attacks launched against the honeypot using the Backtrack OS. Using 
the proposed technique, 25 attacks were successfully detected with a detection rate of 
92.5%. The undetected anomalies were the SSH attack and the Microsoft Message 
Queueing Service Path Overflow exploit. The reason for not detecting these two attacks is 
that they did not cause significant changes in entropy values. In metasploit there was no 
exploit available for Open SSH (tool that was installed in the honeypot) due this the 
exploit that was attempted did not succeed and only a few packets were launched during 
this attack. The second attack, i.e. Microsoft Message Queueing Service Path Overflow 
exploit was also not successful and hence it did not generate many packets to cause 
changes to the entropy values. A total number of 49 attacks which include the 25 attacks 
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generated using metasploit and other attacks caused by other machines in the network 
were detected. 
The K-means clustering was applied on the entropy values and Figure 4-21 shows the 
different clusters that were detected. Four cluster regions were detected in the LabTrace. 
The cluster one was the normal traffic and the cluster two and three represents metasploit 
exploits and SMB attacks, respectively. 
 
Figure 4-21: K-Means Cluster view of Labtrace 
The time view trace (refer to Figure 4-22) shows the different times at which the events 
occurred in the honeypot lab trace during the 25 day period. The attacks were generated 
five days after the honeypot was connected to the Internet and most of the attacks were 
generated during the end. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
90 
 
Figure 4-22: Time view of Labtrace 
4.3.4 Dionaea Capture Trace 
 
Figure 4-23: Cluster plot of Dionaea Capture Day1 Trace 
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The cluster plot in Figure 4-23 shows the scattered points of the trace. The points having 
high entropy values are related to the port scan activity seen in the trace. The points in the 
region of the x-axis from 3 to 6 are related to brute force attempts and connection 
attempts to FTP and HTTP services. 
 
Figure 4-24: Total Payload Bytes in Dionaea Capture Day1 Trace 
 
Figure 4-25: Total Packets in Dionaea Capture Day1 Trace 
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The volume plots in Figure 4-24 and Figure 4-25 show the visible peaks that correspond 
to anomalies in the traffic. The large peaks were seen due to port scan activity. 
 
Figure 4-26: Cluster Plot of Dionaea Capture Day3 trace 
The cluster plot for day 3 is shown in Figure 4-26. The traffic on day 3 was limited and 
had only few anomalous events compared to the first day. The plot shows only few points 
as most of the points are overlapping with each other. The points having an entropy value 
of more than 2 were anomalous. Volume plots in Figure 4-27 and Figure 4-28 show 
similar activities and the only anomalous event that caused considerable volume change 
was a web server vulnerability scanning. 
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Figure 4-27: Total Payload Bytes for Dionaea Day3 Capture 
 
Figure 4-28: Total Packets for Dionaea Day3 Capture 
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4.3.4.1 Types of Anomalies Detected 
The list of anomalies that were detected in day1 traffic is explained in the Table 4-9. 
Table 4-9 : Anomalies detected in Dionaea Day1 capture trace 
Detected Behavior 
Type of Anomaly by Manual 
Analysis 
Anomaly 
Behavior by 
Reverse 
Mapping 
Reported 
Anomalies 
DP(VH), SP(VH), 
TB(H), PC(VH) 
3 occurrences 
Port Scan 
Different NMAP port scan 
types were used to scan the 
honeypot. 
Port Scan 3 occurrences 
DP(M), SP(M), 
TB(H), PC(M) 
1 occurrence 
 
MS-SQL Brute force 
attempts 
Multiple login attempts were 
made to break into the 
MSSQL server using different 
passwords. 
System 
Compromise 
1 occurrence 
DP(M), SP(H) 
2 occurrences 
Web Robots (also known as 
Web Wanderers, Crawlers, 
or Spiders) 
These probes can either be 
malicious if they are coming 
from malicious users or it 
could be from search engine 
websites like Google which try 
to index the web sites on the 
network. 
Detected 
behavior is not 
available in the 
known behavior 
set 
2 occurrences 
DP(M), SP(M) 
4 occurrences 
Connection attempts on 
popular ports (HTTP, FTP, 
MSSQL etc.) 
These could be potential 
attacks as they are 
Detected 
behavior is not 
available in the 
known behavior 
set. 
4 occurrences 
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unauthorized users trying to 
connect to services available 
on the honeypot. 
Not Detected X X 
SIP worm 
reported 
1 occurrence 
Total Anomalies 
Detected = 10 
  
Total 
Anomalies 
Reported = 11 
Anomaly Detection Rate 90.9% 
 
A total of 10 anomalies were detected with a detection rate of 90.9% in the day1 dionaea 
traces which fall in the categories mentioned in Table 4-9.   
List of anomalies detected in day 3 traffic are given in Table 4-10. In this trace, the 
maximum entropy value detected is 3.5. The destination IP entropy is equal to zero for 
most of the duration of the trace as there were only one or two IP addresses seen during 
most of five minute intervals. 
Table 4-10: Anomalies detected in Dionaea day3 capture trace 
Detected Behavior 
Type of Anomaly (by 
Manual Analysis) 
Anomaly Behavior 
by Reverse Mapping 
Reported 
Anomalies 
SP(M), TB(M) 
1 occurrence 
Phpmydmin Attack 
A number of packets were 
sent to the port 80 and from 
different ports to connect to 
PhpMyadmin 
Detected behavior is 
not available in the 
known behavior set. 
1 occurrence 
DP(M), SP(M) 
1 occurrence 
FTP connection attempts 
Connections attempts to the 
FTP server made from 
different ports. 
Detected behavior is 
not available in the 
known behavior set. 
1 occurrence 
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DP(M), SP(H), 
TB(M), PC(M) 
1 occurrence 
Web Server Vulnerability 
Scanning 
The web server was scanned 
for vulnerabilities 
Detected behavior is 
not available in the 
known behavior set. 
1 occurrence 
Not Detected X X 
SIP Worm 
reported 
1 occurrence 
Total Anomalies 
Detected = 3 
  
Total 
Anomalies 
Reported = 4 
Anomaly Detection Rate 75% 
 
The K-means cluster plot in Figure 4-29 shows the visible clusters in the dionaea capture. 
The cluster three represents the port scanning activity and the cluster two represents the 
other attacks discussed in Table 4-10. A total of 3 anomalies with were detected with an 
anomaly detection rate of 75% in the day3 trace. Similar events happened at different 
times of the day during the dionaea capture as seen in the time view plot of Figure 4-30. 
The SIP scanning worm was not detected using the proposed technique. The SIP worm 
was not detected because; during each connection attempt it was sending only two 
packets to the honeypot. Due this the anomaly did not cause significant changes in the 
selected features. 
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Figure 4-29: K-Means Cluster plot for Dionaea Capture 
 
Figure 4-30:  Time View of Dionaea Capture Trace 
1 
2 
3 
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4.4 Recall and Precision of Anomaly Behavior 
Detection 
Recall and precision metrics were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the reverse 
mapping applied to detect the anomaly behavior from the predicted behavior.Table 4-11 
summarizes the anomaly detection rate as well as precision and recall percentages for the 
proposed technique. The metrics used are [36] : 
        
              
                             
 
           
              
                              
 
Table 4-11: Recall and Precision of Anomaly Behavior Detection 
Data Set 
Anomaly Detection 
Rate 
Anomaly Behavior Detection 
R D I 
Precision % 
(I/D) 
Recall % 
(I/R) 
Scan 27 Trace 91.6% 10 4 3 75% 30% 
LabTrace 92.5% 43 23 19 82.6% 44.18% 
Dionaea Trace 86.6% 9 4 3 75% 33.33% 
Total 
Anomaly detection 
Rate: 90.25% 
62 31 25 80.65% 40.32% 
Table 4-12: Recall and Precision without considering multiple occurrences 
Data Set R D I 
Precision % 
(I/D) 
Recall % 
(I/R) 
Scan 27 Trace 6 4 3 75% 50% 
LabTrace 4 5 3 60% 75% 
Dionaea Trace 3 2 1 50% 33.33% 
Total 13 11 7 63.63% 53.84% 
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The anomaly detection rate measures the percentage of anomalies detected based on the 
reported behavior out of all anomalies reported for the trace. A detection rate of 90.25% 
was achieved based on the threshold levels (discussed in section 3.7Error! Reference 
source not found.) used in the proposed technique. The effectiveness of mapping the 
detected anomaly behavior to the appropriate anomaly was found using precision and 
recall metrics. A precision of 80.65% and a recall percentage of 40.32% were achieved 
using the proposed technique when all the occurrences of different anomalies are taken 
into account. The precision and recall percentages for detecting the anomaly type i.e. 
without considering multiple occurrences for each type (refer to Table 4-12) show better 
recall percentages compared to previous values in Table 4-11. The values obtained in 
Table 4-11 are based on the fact that certain anomalies occurred many times and did not 
match the predicted behavior set (refer to Table 3-18). This led to decrease of the recall 
value. The reason for getting low values for the recall is that we have only few number of 
anomaly behaviors mapped in the predicted behavior set. Therefore, we expect the recall 
to improve if more traces are used to update the mapping table (Table 3-18) obtained in 
the previous chapter. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter described in detail the different results that were obtained using the anomaly 
detection technique. The feature-based parameters i.e., Destination IP entropy, 
Destination Port entropy and Source Port entropy were used to obtain the cluster plots. 
Two volume-based features i.e., Total Payload Bytes and Total Packet Count were used 
to obtain the volume plots. The details of traces that were used in testing our proposed 
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technique were discussed in this chapter. The total number of anomalies detected using 
this technique as well as the types of anomalies detected were presented. 
The results mainly focus on the anomaly detection rate obtained using the proposed 
technique. In Honeynet systems, all traffic coming to the honeypots is considered 
malicious. Based on this fact, we are not presenting the false alarm rate and we consider 
that anomalies that are detected are all malicious activities. The results show that the 
proposed technique has a detection rate of 90% and enabled the detection of most of the 
anomalies in the network traffic. In addition the proposed technique achieved a recall of 
40% and precision of 80.65%. This technique will be very useful for anomaly detection in 
Honeynet systems, as it will ease the data analysis process. The use of both volume-based 
and feature-based parameters is very important in detecting the anomalies in any network 
traffic. 
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Chapter 5 
5 
Conclusion and Future Work 
Data analysis is one of the key aspects in understanding the behavior of network attacks. 
The success of Honeynet systems depends in successfully detecting the attack and 
understanding the behavior of the attack. The main focus of this thesis work is to use an 
anomaly detection technique to detect anomalies and determine the anomaly type. In this 
thesis work an anomaly detection approach based on feature-based parameters and 
volume-based parameters is addressed. The entropy distributions of feature-based 
parameters and volume change of volume-based parameters were used to identify the best 
feature sets and to define the anomaly behavior. 
A number of tests were carried out on various test datasets and the best features suitable 
for honeynet traffic were selected. The selected features were: 
 Destination IP Entropy (DIP) 
 Destination Port Entropy (DP) 
 Source Port Entropy (SP) 
 Total Payload Bytes (TB) 
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 Total Packet Count (PC) 
Using the test data sets and the selected features the anomaly behavior was proposed. The 
threshold levels of the selected features were used to detect anomalies in live traces. Also 
K-means clustering plot was used to identify the different clusters available in the traces. 
A detection rate of 90.25% was achieved using the proposed anomaly detection 
technique. The predicted behavior set was used to identify the types of anomalies in the 
traces. A recall percentage of 40.32% and precision percentage of 80.65% was achieved 
using the proposed behavior detection approach.  
The main Contributions of this thesis work are: 
 Identifying best features suitable for Honeynet traffic. 
 Using packet header details and volume changes to identify anomalies 
 Identifying anomaly behaviors using reverse mapping or pattern matching. 
 Identifying anomalies in Honeynet Traffic with a detection rate of 90%. 
5.1 Future Research 
The proposed anomaly detection technique can be extended to cover the following topics: 
 A large database of the different anomaly behaviors can be created by using many 
test data sets. This will increase the recall percentage and will enhance the 
anomaly behavior detection capabilities. 
 The anomaly points in the trace could be used along with some reverse 
engineering techniques to identify the actives of the anomaly. For example if 
bruteforce anomaly occurred then using some reverse engineering technique the 
type of service that was attacked could be determined. 
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 The proposed anomaly detection technique can be used with some payload 
analysis techniques to determine the exact vulnerabilities that were exploited 
during the attack. 
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